doubt, part two; kantian ethics

part one

The second particularly striking aspect of the movie comes in two parts. The first opens the movie; it is a sermon delivered by Father Flynn on the subject of doubt. He preaches that "doubt can be a bond as strong as certainty;" that we can be united by the fact that we are uncertain about our faith, about whether we have judged correctly, about whether there is hope for the world, etc.

The second comes at the end of the movie. In this, Sister Aloysius, who has until now demonstrated an inquisitor's absolute certainty in Father Flynn's guilt and the appropriate way to handle it, confesses to Sister James "I have such doubts." These two moments bookend Sister Aloysius' relentless prosecution of Father Flynn; the two characters are systematically unable to find that common ground: they are strictly adversaries.

This is an example, a fictional illustration, of something that I've been mulling for a while now, a certain issue in neo-Kantian ethics. Here's the short version: most Kantians think that the basis of their moral theory is something variously called freedom, autonomy, reflectivity, etc. The way I would have of cashing this out is with the thought that any of our commitments are subject to revision; we need to realize that we might be wrong - very wrong - concerning the things about which we feel the greatest certainty. (To steal a bit of deep wisdom from Donald Rumsfeld, there are unknown unknowns.) What this enables is a certain kind of relationship between people: a relationship of inquiring together after what the good is.

Now, most Kantians think that this sort of relationship is necessitated by our freedom; they also think it is one in which there isn't so much conflict between people. The way in which we work together prevents essential conflict from coming between us. Put another way, these Kantians think that from this formal fact about ourselves (freedom) certain substantive conclusions follow (morality, as it is traditionally understood). I am starting to wonder about whether this conclusion actually follows from the premises.

One way of putting this is: the argument itself doesn't make so much sense. The original point was that we can question any values; the conclusion is that there are certain values we can be absolutely sure of. If we really can put any commitment to the question, then you and I may very well wind up with very different moral views.

In other words, while I think it is possible for freedom to underwrite a very specific kind of relationship, one that I think is truly valuable, I don't think that freedom necessitates it. After inquiring together, you and I may go our separate ways; we may even be enemies. In a way, this is what happened with Sister Aloysius and Father Flynn: despite both being free, doubting creatures, they held to radically different conclusions, and were in that way adversaries.

(another way of putting this discussion is that there is a difference between the sort of possibility for doubt that constitutes freedom, and the specific doubts we may entertain about a certain possibility - such as whether or not the Krispy Kreme in Chatham is open tonight).

see also