Tuesday, January 6, 2009

arrogance and humility

I sent these quotes out while thinking about arrogance and humility. I would argue that there are, in fact, both good and bad forms of arrogance and humility, and that the good forms of each are in fact compatible with each other. I specifically want to talk about arrogance and humility in the context of inquiry.

There is a certain degree of arrogance that is required when conducting inquiry. That is, when I assert something, one of the things that I am committed to is thinking that everyone who disagrees with me is wrong. And there is a real sort of arrogance involved in this - "who am I to say such things?"

Of course, this can shade into a dangerous kind of arrogance. That is, it is arrogant to not only assert that I am right, but that I must be right, that I am sure that I am right. When on is arrogant in this way, one starts to simply deny (on face) the contrary assertions of others. I don't even begin to think about what they say (I don't begin to imaginatively enter into their position); I don't try and meet their objection - because, after all, they're wrong.

Avoiding this arrogance, however, can lead us to a dangerous kind of humility. This is the humility of (to steal Conant's phrase) not even "sticking one's neck out." I do this when I start to qualify everything I say - "Well, it seems to me" / "I think that" / "This is just my opinion, and I might be wrong." What one is doing is refusing to stand behind one's words. That is, you might manage to disprove what I've said, but you can't touch me. The problem is that you get further and further away from asserting anything.

But there is a closely related, and good, kind of humility. This is just the humility involved in realizing that I might, in fact, be wrong. I need to be meet objections; they can't exactly be ignored. Humility in the search for truth is a difficult undertaking.

What I mean to say is this: good arrogance and humility are both compatible and constitutive virtues of inquiry. Part of what it is to seek after truth is to have both. Dangerously, both are closely related - both shade into - pernicious arrogance and humility (which are not compatible). When one starts displaying either of these traits, then one is no longer (exactly) engaged in inquiry. I've started doing something else entirely. (This is the Platonist in me talking).

In short: inquiry requires enough arrogance to assert that I am, in fact, correct (and perhaps even justified), and enough humility to admit that I might, in fact, be wrong.

2 comments:

Jon said...

I noticed recently that I have been using "I want to say/am tempted to say" as a crutch, similar to the qualifications you describe. I qualify what I write that way, in order to not have to put my neck out. I am having to reinvent a lot of my writing style in philosophy papers, because of this.

JS said...

Yeah... I do the same thing as well - though I think I don't do it very much in papers, I do it a lot in less formal contexts.